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Two different theoretical treatments of technology diffusion in an economy are 
examined. The traditional model based on the aggregate production function approach 
first introduced by Solow (1957) assumes technology is unstructured and arrives as a 
continuous exogenous flow. This model predicts that the diffusion of new 
technologies will be contemporaneously correlated with growth in economic 
performance indicators. An alternative view explicitly models technological structure 
in the form of complementarities. It also incorporates the observation that new general 
purpose technologies (GPTs) invariably emerge in a crude form lacking many of the 
complementary technologies that enable them to become productive. This view 
predicts that when new technologies emerge costly investment in developing 
complementary technologies must take place and thus there will be a lag between the 
new technology’s introduction and observed growth in economic performance 
indicators. These two views articulate two general empirically testable hypotheses 
that are captured in a number of specific tests. One such test measures diffusion of 
information and communication technologies (ICT) as an independent phenomenon 
and compares its times series pattern to that of the growth of productivity in New 
Zealand. New Zealand’s experience in consistent with other OECD economies where 
the diffusion of ICT has occurred at the same time as a productivity slowdown. 
Another test measures relative ICT-skilled labour demand. Although the evidence is 
weak, findings support the non-traditional view’s prediction that ICT-skilled labour 
will increase with the diffusion of ICT technology in New Zealand.  
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 1. Introduction 
This paper is about the economic growth or lack thereof caused by information and 
communication technology (ICT). Has ICT caused a revolution in global production 
and communication, or not? The answer to this question lies in separating the 
diffusion of this technology from measured output or productivity gains generated by 
it.     
There seems to be little disagreement that computers, the Internet and the myriad 
supporting complementary technologies that they have enabled, have revolutionized 
production taking the world into the age of the global economy
2 - an economy 
characterized by integrated transportation services, virtually instantaneous global 
communication, just-in-time or lean production, and un-hierarchical footloose 
multinational firms that can chase cheap factors of production around the globe. What 
is debated is whether this technological revolution is having the kinds revolutionary 
influences on economic growth that were witnessed with the First and Second 
Industrial Revolutions, themselves based on the technologies of automated textile 
manufacturing and steam in the case of the First and electricity, machine tools and 
chemicals manufacturing in the case of the Second. In short is the revolutionary 
technology of ICT leading to revolutionary growth? 
Economic historians and students of technology agree that technological change is the 
major determinant of very long-term economic growth. If we knew no more than 
Victorian Age Europeans, our living standards would not be far above theirs, perhaps 
slightly more, due to such things as more capital accumulation, but not much.
3 Yet, 
over shorter periods of time, there is debate over what proportion of measured 
economic growth is due to technological change and what to other forces, such as the 
accumulation of physical and human capital. Such debates imply that we are able to 
separate the effects of technological change from those of the other determinants. Our 
view is that in order to become productively useful all technological knowledge must 
become embodied in some real physical component of the work whether it is physical 
or human capital (including all tacit skills), laws and legal institutions, or social and 
cultural norms. Furthermore, each of these embodiments requires costly investment. 
So the separation of the contribution of technological change from the contribution 
measured factors such as physical and human capital to economic growth is difficult. 
The key to connecting technological change to economic growth lies in identifying 
specific embodiments of new technology and determining their contribution to 
economic growth over a long horizon. 
The debate about technologies contribution to economic growth is currently focussed 
on ICT’s impact on economic growth. At the centre of this debate is the so called 
productivity paradox that is a combination of a number of stylised and anecdotal 
observations about the proliferation of computers and ICT with the statistical 
observation of a decline in the growth rate of total or multi - factor productivity (TFP 
or MFP)
4 in many OECD countries, starting in the early 1970’s and running through 
                                                 
2 However, some economist, such as, Young (1992) and Krugman (1996) commenting on him argue 
that the lack of high total factor productivity in the Asian economies that experience exceptional 
growth in GDP per capita throught the 1970s and 1980s is evidence that no technological revolution 
occurred in these economies.  
3 Of course, technological change and investment are interrelated, the latter being the main vehicle by 
which the former enters the production process. 
4 TFP and MFP are treated as synonyms for the purposes of this paper. to the middle of the 1990’s. This paradox is typified by Solow’s (1987) quip that the 
computer is everywhere except in the productivity statistics. The erroneous 
presumption that underwrites the paradox is that TFP measures technological change 
in a perfectly, contemporaneously correlated fashion.  
One view in this debate holds that the paradox has been resolved by the emergence of 
the New Economy in the United States as evidenced by the measured increase in TFP 
growth starting in the mid 1990s. (See for example Baily 2002.) An alternative view 
is that there is no paradox at all because the productivity statistics show that no 
technological revolution has occurred. For one example, see Young 1992 and 
Krugman 1996 commenting on the growth experience of Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Taiwan and South Korea. For another example see Triplett (1999) and Gordon (2000) 
arguing that there is no exceptional growth driven by the introduction of computing 
technologies.
5 We take these two views as being representative of what we call the 
traditional view of growth driven by technological change. This view is typified by 
the aggregate production function first introduced by Solow (1956) in which 
technology is captured by an exogenous shift parameter, is unstructured and has a 
contemporaneous, positive impact on output. We call this the “traditional” view. 
Yet another view is that there is no paradox because there is a real technology cycle 
that causes real productivity slowdowns.
6  David (1990) and David and Wright (1999) 
observe such a cycle with the introduction of electricity in to US manufacturing in late 
19
th and early 20
th centuries. In line with this view a number of students of general 
purpose technologies (GPTs)
7 argue that the introduction of new GPTs can cause 
large structural adjustment costs as the economy exploits the new technology. (See for 
example Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998a and b)), Howitt (1998), Aghion and 
Howitt(1998) and Lipsey, Bekar and Carlaw (1998b)).  These theoretical views 
reconcile the observed facts of large-scale technological change with initial declining 
productivity numbers by noting that some technological change brings with it a costly 
adjustment process. Lipsey, Bekar and Carlaw (1998b) argue that the pattern is not 
necessarily inherent in the new GPTs themselves, but it is a possible outcome of the 
interaction between new GPTs and the existing economic structure into which they 
are introduced. If there is sufficient friction between the new technologies and the 
existing economic structure, including necessary redesigns of physical capital, 
reskilling of human capital and changes in the organizational technology of firms then 
a real productivity slowdown can follow the introduction of a transforming GPT for a 
time. But the introduction of the GPT ultimately rejuvenates growth and there is a 
long term productivity benefit. We call this third view the “non-traditional” view.  
The traditional view of growth and technological change has an immediate and easy 
to test hypothesis. Output Growth and technological change are contemporaneously 
and positively correlated. So there is a paradox for those in the traditional view that 
                                                 
5 Triplett’s argument is based on the observation that it is not sufficient to observe that there are a 
number of new products introduced as the result of a new technology. The important factor is that the 
rate of introduction of new products has increased from one technology to the next. Only in the latter 
case will TFP growth show an increase. Gordon argues that despite productivity numbers that match or 
exceed those of the second Industrial Revolution, the current productivity boom in the US driven by 
computing technology is not as large as that experienced between 1870 and 1913. 
6 See Helpman (1998) for a number of theoretical and historical views on how major new general 
purpose technologies maintain and affect long-run economic growth. 
7 Lipsey, Bekar and Carlaw (1998a) define GPTs as technologies that have massive scope for 
improvement, come to have pervasive range and variety of use in an economy and that have myriad 
technological complementarities with existing and yet to be invented technologies.  observe the proliferation of ICT but no productivity boom until late in 1990’s. Or 
alternatively there is no paradox for those who say that the computer is not a major 
new technology. In either case technological change is viewed as having 
contemporaneous impact on output and as being measured by productivity growth. So 
we should expect to observe a positive correlation between the diffusion of a new 
technology and measured productivity growth rates  
The non-traditional view generates the testable hypothesis that a new technology’s 
impact on growth will not be immediately positive and potentially can initially cause 
productivity slow downs which will be turned around as the technology mature. So 
we should expect to observe no correlation or even a negative correlation between 
technological diffusion rates and productivity growth rates.  
In this paper we examine what if anything the data tell us in New Zealand. Our data is 
limited causing our conclusions to be more conjecture then final statements. What we 
do see is some support for the non-traditional view in the New Zealand data.  
2. The Traditional View 
Solow’s (1956) article provides a starting point for what has become a huge body of 
literature that falls under the rubric of what we call “traditional” growth models, 
which we will take to include some of the more recent endogenous growth models. 
(For examples of the later, see Romer 1986 and Lucas 1988.) A defining 
characteristic of these models is that they have stationary equilibrium concepts and 
technological change is modelled such that contemporaneous growth occurs with the 
arrival of new technology.  
In the original Solow model technology is exogenous and enters the aggregate 
production function in a Hicks neutral fashion. The usual relationship is derived from 
a constant returns to scale aggregate production function, in this case defined over 
labour (L) and physical capital (K).  
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αα =− − − =  where At is the state of Hicks neutral technology and Yt is total output. An immediate 
implication of this formulation is that productivity rises immediately with the arrival 
of the technology. When Solow’s framework is generalized to more than one sector or 
economy technological change is assumed to remain contemporaneously correlated 
with productivity change as there is an implicit assumption that diffusion of new 
technology occurs instantaneously and uniformly across all production activities. 
Many of the new endogenous growth models, in which a positive rate of economic 
growth is sustained by investment behaviour, also have this characteristic. Again 
many of these models also assume instantaneous diffusion across sectors or 
economies.  
As we noted in the introduction, measures of TFP change are often interpreted to be 
an indication of the rate of technological progress within an economy. This 
interpretation is predicated on a definition of technology in terms of output and its 
associated inputs at some level of aggregation. In other words technology is not 
defined and measured independently. Rather is implicitly defined by observations of 
economic performance variables and is measured as a residual of observed economic 
output net of observed inputs. Thus, in this view the measurement of technological 
change does not require observations that are independent of output. Nor is it 
necessary to develop a theory that explains how technology leads to economic growth 
because the two are conceptually inseparable. It does, however, require that the 
specific assumption of the theory of aggregate output and economic growth to hold in 
order for the measurement to be valid.  
Again as noted in the introduction there are a number of economist that study 
productivity, economic history, technological change and economic growth who have 
argued that TFP is not a measure of technological change. This different view is 
predicated in part on a recognition that technological change is largely endogenous to 
economic choices and costs real resources to achieve, resources which are capitalized 
in to the measure of inputs in the TFP calculation because embodiment of technology 
requires investment. The view is also in part based on a definition of technology 
knowledge that is independent of the aggregate economic observations of output and 
traditionally measured inputs. Lipsey and Carlaw (2004 forthcoming) define 
technological knowledge “as the idea set that specifies all activities that create 
economic value. It comprises knowledge about product technologies, the 
specifications of everything that is produced, process technologies, the specifications 
of all processes by which goods and services are produced, and organizational 
technologies, the specification of how productive activity is organized. All these are 
often referred to as just technology…” Technological knowledge for the most part 
enters the economic system by costly investment which embodies it in such things as 
human and physical capital, institutional and productive infrastructure, conventions, 
laws, and social norms.  
In their monograph Economic Transformations: General Purpose Technologies and 
Long Term Economic Growth, which is currently under review by a publisher Carlaw, 
Lipsey and Bekar outline in great detail how the economic structure of a society is 
altered by GPTs that they call “transforming GPTs”. It is often the case that there are 
long lags between the invention of such technologies and the economic bonus that 
they yield. Some of the reasons that these lags exist are because all technologies start 
out crudely and relatively under developed; the system into which the become 
embodied must be altered via costly investment to exploit them; there are often 
entrenched interest that fight the technologies introduction into the system because it implies the destruction of rents to these interests; and myriad complementary 
technologies have to be invented and an invested in before the full potential of such 
GPTs can be exploited. For these reasons and many others detailed in the Carlaw et al 
monograph, there is no positive contemporaneous relationship between technological 
change and productivity change. In fact in a number of cases their theory predicts that 
productivity growth will slow or even fall as a result of the introduction of a new 
transforming GPT. Furthermore it is necessary to develop a theory of how 
technologies enter the economy and come to have an influence on economic 
performance. This also requires a definition and measurement of technology that is 
independent of economic performance. In section QQ we measure technological 
change independent of economic performance because we know all of the details in 
our simulation model that we develop next. In section six we are able to proximately 
measure the ICT diffusion rate with a measure of the diffusion of computers in New 
Zealand. 
3. Models of GPT-Driven Growth 
In this section, we provide a model of GPT-Driven growth in order to establish a 
theory of why technological change is not contemporaneously correlated with 
productivity change. We first list the assumptions of our baseline model which is 
based on Carlaw and Lipsey (2001), Carlaw and Lipsey (2005 forthcoming) and 
Carlaw et al (monograph Chapter 14). These are intended to capture some of the key 
stylized facts concerning GPTs such as those listed in Carlaw and Lipsey (2005 
forthcoming) and Carlaw et al (monograph). We also use a series of footnotes to 
compare our assumptions with those made in the other GPT models many of which 
are reviewed in Chapter 11 of Carlaw at al (monograph). We then develop the model 
to include endogenous structural adjustment that occurs to accommodate some new 
GPTs such as has been noted by David (1990) in his observations of the economic 
impacts following the introduction of computers and the electric dynamo.  
Our base line model has three sectors: (i) a single consumption good, which we refer 
to as “the consumption sector” (ii) R&D that produces applied knowledge that is used 
to develop applications of each GPT to specific purposes, called “the applied-R&D 
sector” and (iii) fundamental research that produces the pure knowledge that leads to 
new GPTs, called “the pure research sector.” In all cases, the sectors employ the same 
generic resource and are, therefore, related to each other by their resource opportunity 
cost as measured by foregone current consumption, which permits the productivity 
enhancing accumulation of technological knowledge.
8  The production function in 
each sector displays diminishing returns to the resources that are used.  The models 
also display diminishing returns to accumulation in the absence of new GPTs, which 
are interrupted when a new GPT arrives by the temporary bursts of historical 
increasing returns of the sort discussed in Chapter 12 of Carlaw et al (monograph). 
But these increasing returns to scale are only a temporary phenomenon because in all 
cases there are limits to the scale effects that can be exploited by each new GPT. So 
we do not have the kind of permanent increasing returns to accumulation found in 
many endogenous macro growth models.
9 
                                                 
8 Aghion and Howitt (1998) employ three sectors in their model, and Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998b) 
employ m identical sectors in their diffusion model, most other GPT models use two sectors. 
9 For examples of endogenous growth models with increasing returns see Romer (1986) and Lucas 
(1988). This allows us to focus attention on the complementarities and to model knowledge 
that grows irregularly. Our model’s growth process is largely conditioned by the 
characteristics of each new GPT, such as those micro observations reviewed in 
Carlaw et al (monograph Chapter 4).  
We know that new GPTs create technological complementarities that rejuvenate the 
growth process. They enable new product, process and organizational technologies 
and the development of these sustain the productivity of both fundamental and applied 
research as a long-term trend, if not from year to year. In our base-line model, we 
confine these complementarities to process technologies. When a new GPT is 
developed, it has a direct complementarity with pre-existing knowledge and current 
resources in the applied R&D sector, making them more productive. Output from the 
applied R&D sector enables the GPT to have an indirect complementarity with the 
consumption and pure knowledge sectors, as applied R&D knowledge goes into those 
sectors, making resources and prior knowledge in each more productive.
10 
11  
We use an individual logistic curve to represent the evolution of each GPT’s impact 
on the marginal productivity of applied R&D, and hence on the consumption sector. 
The logistic curve models the observation that GPTs start crudely and only slowly 
develop a wide range of uses and many complementarities.
12 
In common with all other models of GPTs, technology is assumed to have a 
hierarchical structure meaning that some technologies are necessary antecedents for 
others.
13 This is in contrast to standard aggregate growth models where technology is 
modelled by a single scalar multiple of the aggregate production function.   
Technological change is modelled as a succession of GPTs that set the path dependent 
research agenda for further applied R&D.
14  
                                                 
10 Bresnahan and Trajtenberg’s (1992) vertical and horizontal complementarities are similar to our 
technological complementarities. Other GPT models have a complementarity only between the GPT 
and its supporting components, which are created by the R&D sector for use along side the GPT in the 
final output sector. The components themselves are substitutes for each other, which does not mirror 
what we see with many complimentary components that comprise technology systems such as those 
described in Carlaw and Lipsey (2002). 
11 In Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998a), the effect of GPTs is registered through the rate of component 
development, which is linear. In Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998b) the effect of the GPT is registered 
through the combined effect of component development and the diffusion process, which holds back 
the impact of the GPT until all sectors that can use it have developed a threshold number of 
complementary components. Thereafter the GPTs impact linearly on the economy. Aghion and Howitt 
(1998) have an epidemic effect where the development of the GPT actually causes a reduction in 
output after a period of constant output. An increase in output finally occurs as a result of an epidemic 
diffusion process in their model. 
12 This is the first major departure from the models of Carlaw and Lipsey (2001) and Carlaw and 
Lipsey (2005 forthcoming). Those models allowed the full productive impact of a GPT to enter the 
system upon the GPTs discovery. It is also in contrast to Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998a and 1998b) 
and Aghion and Howitt (1998) where once the GPT arrives in a given sector, its efficiency depends 
linearly on the development of components. Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998b) and Aghion and Howitt 
(1998) develop detailed theoretical mechanisms for diffusion of the GPT into applications. In each of 
these cases, the pattern of output is determined by the diffusion process across firms and sectors where 
the efficiency of the GPT in each sector increases with the development of components up to some 
maximum.   
13 For example, as we have noted elsewhere, the electronic computer cannot exist without the power 
technology of electricity. 
14 All other GPT models surveyed in Chapter 11 of Carlaw, Lipsey and Bekar (monograph) verbally 
describe this succession of GPTs but concentrate on the formal dynamics of a single GPT from the time 
that it is exogenously introduced into the economy until it reaches full maturity. We introduce uncertainty in pure knowledge production in three ways: (i) the 
productivity of resources devoted to pure research in every period is subject to 
random fluctuations; (ii) the time period between arrivals of successive GPTs is of 
uncertain duration (but typically long); and (iii) the effect of a newly arrived GPT on 
productivity in the applied R&D sector is partly determined endogenously by the 
amount of resources devoted to the pure research sector since the last GPT was 
invented and partly by a random variable.
15  
For any given period, we assume that agents allocate resources among the three 
sectors according to the current expected marginal product of resources in each sector, 
which, under certain assumptions, is equivalent to perfect competition.
16 Whatever the 
specific rule agents use for making allocations among the three sectors, we require 
only that they respond to relative differences in perceived rates of returns in the three 
sectors.
17  
In our model, agents do not know the precise future consumption payoff to resources 
allocated to pure research because they do not know the probability distributions that 
are generating the disturbances on the outcomes, nor can they infer them from the 
behaviour of previous GPTs. So they form expectations of the payoffs to investments 
based on their perceptions of the current period’s marginal productivities. Given these 
expectations, they allocate resources so as to maximise the value of current 
consumption.
18 This is meant to model agents as groping into an uncertain future in a 
profit oriented way.  
In all other treatments, agents are modelled as having perfect foresight about the 
future evolution of new GPTs. Our assumption of no foresight seems closer to what 
we observe than the assumption that agents are sufficiently foresighted to maximise 
over the whole of a GPT’s lifetime. Nonetheless, one might wonder if agents could 
learn over successive GPTs and thus eventually be able to anticipate the course of 
each new one. We reject this possibility because GPTs are technologically distinct 
from each other so that the histories of past GPTs provide little quantitative evidence 
about how new ones will behave. For example, knowing how the steam engine 
                                                 
15 In contrast, the impact and arrival date of new GPTs are exogenous in all other models except 
Aghion and Howitt (1992 and 1998), There the arrival rate of technologies/GPTs is subject to a Poisson 
arrival process but in the steady-state equilibrium that arrival rate is constant and conditional on the 
first moment of the Poisson distribution. 
16 Within the framework developed here we could model the consumption sector and/or the applied 
R&D sector as being characterized by monopolistic competition. The sector in question would 
comprise several products differentiated by a parameter. Adding the complication of monopolistic 
competition does not change the qualitative results so we retain the simpler assumption of perfect 
competition.  
17 None of the GPT models reviewed in Chapter 11 of Carlaw, Lipsey and Bekar (monograph) have 
endogenously generated GPTs. Therefore, there is no allocation of resources to a sector that generates 
new GPTs such as our pure knowledge sector. Aghion and Howitt (1992) have endogenously generated 
technological change where the allocation of labour to producing technological change is derived from 
a perfectly foresighted maximization based on a stationary Poisson distribution. In all of the GPT 
models allocations of resources to the sectors developing components and templates for the newly 
arrived GPT is based on forward looking expectations with stationary distributions. 
18 As an alternative to our simple assumption, we could have assumed that agents are forward looking 
but do not foresee changes in the marginal products in all lines of production, which implies that they 
perform the dynamic programming problem each period taking the perceived marginal products in all 
lines of activities as being constant at the current period level. In the subsequent period, they repeat the 
procedure with the new marginal products encountered that period. Since in our model these amount to 
the same thing qualitatively, we adopt the first assumption which is vastly simpler. affected the economy over the several hundred years of its evolution would tell agents 
virtually nothing about the details of the evolutionary paths to be expected over the 
next couple of hundred years for all of the economic impacts of electricity at the time 
when the dynamo was invented in 1867.
19 
The model generates a non-stationary equilibrium, such that neither the levels nor the 
rates of change of the endogenous variables converge to constants. There is a 
transitional competitive equilibrium in every time period, given the expected marginal 
productivities of inputs in each sector.
 But because of technological advance, the 
nature of the spillovers, and the absence of perfect foresight, the marginal products 
change from one period to the next in ways that are not anticipated. Although growth 
never stops, a very productive new GPT can accelerate the average growth rate over 
its lifetime while a less productive new GPT can slow it. This last characteristic 
allows us to focus on the historical, path dependent and variable pattern of growth. In 
contrast, other models typically use a steady state equilibrium concept.
20  
To summarize, our model has the following key characteristics. GPTs arrive at 
randomly determined times with an impact on the productivity of applied R&D that is 
determined by the amount of pure research knowledge that has been endogenously 
generated since the last GPT and elements of randomness. The three sources of 
randomness outlined above imply that in the short term outcomes are influenced by 
the particular realizations of the random variables, allowing the average growth rate 
of output over the lifetime of each successive GPT to differ from that of it 
predecessor. However, the average growth rate over long periods of time in which 
several GPTs succeed each other is determined by the accumulated amount of pure 
knowledge. This is partly endogenous (determined by the allocation of resources to 
pure research), and partly exogenous (determined by random factors affecting the 
productivity and timing of those resources). Furthermore, while some GPT driven 
research programs are richer than others, there is no reason to expect that successive 
GPTs will always either accelerate or decelerate growth on average over their 
lifetimes. There is no expectation that each new GPT will produce a “productivity 
bonus” in the form of an acceleration to the rate of productivity growth.  
3.1 Baseline Three Sector Model 
There is a generic input called resources, Rt, that is initially allocated between the 
consumption sector, rc,t, the applied R&D sector, ra,t, and the pure knowledge sector 
rg,t.
21   
(1)                                                ,, tc ta tg , t R rrr = ++. 
                                                 
19 We add that, even if successive GPTs did substantially duplicate each other, learning about the future 
behaviour of a current GPT by studying the past behaviour of previous GPTs, would require that 
entrepreneurs knew more about economic history than does the typical economist, to say nothing of the 
typical business person.  
20 Because agents are assumed to be able to foresee and to maximize over the life time of the GPT in all 
other GPT models, a stationary equilibrium is derived from the infinite horizon utility maximization. 
Even in Aghion and Howitt (1992), where there is randomness in the arrival rate of new technologies, 
the rate of innovation is constant in equilibrium. This is because their innovation arrival rate is derived 
from the expected value of the Poisson distribution with a parameter determined by the equilibrium 
flow of labour services into research. 
21 The subscript t indicates a time index. The flow of consumption output, ct in equation (2) is a function of the resources 
allocated to the consumption sector, rc,t, and the productivity coefficient µAt-1. We 
subsequently simplify the model by not lagging the stock of applied R&D in the 
production function for consumption. The parameter µ is set to one in this two sector 
case but will be used in the subsequent three sector model to apportion the stock of 
applied knowledge between consumption and pure knowledge production. 
(2)                                
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The restrictions on the exponential parameter α1 allows for the possibility of constant 
or diminishing returns to applied knowledge while that on a2 ensures that there are 
diminishing returns to resources allocated to consumption . In subsequent models, we 
use both constant and diminishing returns to illustrate specific points about TFP 
calculations and spillovers. 
The flow of applied R&D knowledge at in equation (3) is a function of the resources 
allocated to the applied R&D sector, ra,t, and the productivity coefficient Gt-1. For 
consistency in the initial set up we have lagged the time subscript on G, however, we 
ultimately simplify by removing the lag in the effect of the stock variables on the 
production functions they enter. (See equation 3’ below.) 
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The parameter ν is a calibration parameter for the subsequent simulations. The 
restrictions on the exponential parameters βi ensure that there are diminishing returns 
to resources allocated to consumption and the possibility of constant or diminishing 
returns to pure knowledge. As in the case of the consumption sector, we use both 
constant and diminishing returns to illustrate specific points about TFP calculations 
and spillovers. The current stock of applied knowledge, At, is the accumulated flow of 
produced knowledge, at, minus an obsolescence factor, ε, applied to all past 
accumulations of knowledge, At-1 
The flow of new pure knowledge, gt is generated by: 
(4)                    ()
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The restrictions on the exponential parameters σi ensure that there are diminishing 
returns to resources allocated to pure knowledge, rg,t, while allowing for the 
possibility of constant or diminishing returns to applied knowledge, At. The 
productivity of the resources in this sector is affected, θt, which is a random variable 
distributed uniformly with support [0.8, 1.2], mean 1, and variance (0.4)
2/12. It 
models the observation that one is never sure how much knowledge will be generated 
by a given amount of resources. The first part of this production function, 
1
1 ((1 ) ) t A
σ µ − − , allocates a proportion of the knowledge produced in the applied sector 
to be useful in the consumption sector and acts as the productivity coefficient for 
resources allocated to this sector. The current stock of pure knowledge,  , is the 
accumulated flow of produced knowledge, g
p
t G
t, minus an obsolescence factor, δ, 
applied to all past accumulations of knowledge, G
P
t-1 as follows, 
(5)                                           1 (1 )
pp
tt t Gg G δ − =+ − . Useful pure knowledge only enters the system and becomes Gt when a GPT is 
discovered. This occurs as a result of pure and applied R&D but at randomly 
determined times, when the realization of the random variable λt surpasses a threshold 
value λ*. The model is calibrated by manipulating the parameters ν and η, which are 
defined below so that this realisation occurs infrequently. 
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and tz is the arrival date of the z
th GPT and γ and τ are calibration parameters 
controlling the rate of diffusion. 
λ* is the threshold value of λ and ϑ is a random number that takes on only positive 
values (many of which can be fractions). ϑ,  is a random variable that reflects the fact 
that the applied potential of GPTs vary in ways that cannot be predicted when they are 
originally being developed. Both λ and ϑ are derived from beta distributions, where 
each distribution is defined as 











beta(  with support [0,1], mean 
(ν/(ν+η)) and variance  2 () 1
νη
νη νη ++ +
. Beta(ν,η) is the Beta function, and ν and 
η are parameters which take on positive integer values. ϑ = s(xt) where s is a 
calibration parameter that can be set greater than one to allow occasional productivity 
bonuses with the arrival of some GPTs.
22 
The evolution of actually useful pure knowledge shown in equation (6) can most 
simply be seen as follows. Assume that the potential of the existing GPT has been 
fully exploited so that Gt
h = Gt-1. Now let a new GPT be discovered (λt >λ*). There is 
a discrete jump in ϑ (Gt
p - G
h
t-1) in (7) and this amount slowly diffuses through each 
period of the GPTs existence into actually useful pure knowledge according to the 














  in (6). When another GPT arrives, there is 
a further discrete jump in G


                                                
t
h and the diffusion process begins again. 
 
22 ϑ can also be made endogenous in the following way: ( )( ) tt sx ϑ = , where 
() t sG
ω
κ = and  (0,1) ω∈ . (See Carlaw and Lipsey (2001) an Carlaw and Lipsey 
(2005 forthcoming for a detailed illustration of the model with this assumption.) This 
is a possibility that we don’t explore further in this paper but that implies that the 
productivity impact of all future GPTs can increase through time as a result of the 
realisation of past GPTs. 
 Once again the maximization problem can be expressed in such a way as to allow for 
intertemporal substitution and discounting. The Bellman equation for the three sector 
model is, 
             






































where the upper bars indicate expected rather than the actual values of gt and Gt. This 
is a complicated problem in two dimensions of state variables. We simplify by 
allowing the stocks of applied and pure knowledge to have immediate impact in the 
production functions for consumption, applied R&D and pure knowledge as follows: 
(2’)                   
1
, () tt cA r
α α µ =   with      i2 (0,1],    (1,2), and  1 i α α ∈ =<  
(3’)                    ()
1 2
, tt aG r
β
a t
β ν = with   2 (0,1),   (1,2), and  1 i i β β ∈ =<  
(4’)                   ()
1 2
,, ()( 1 ) () tg t t tg t gr A r
σ σ µθ =− ,       2 0 1   1,2, and  1 i i σ σ < ≤= <  
This allows for an easer expression of the maximization problem without affecting 
any of the qualitative results. 
Maximization problem is: 





















































Recursive substitution of the constraints into the objective function yields the 
following reduced form: 








µµ δ ε −−
  = − +− +−    
.  
The expectations operator is applied to the Stock of applied knowledge in this 
equation because there is a problem of simultaneous determination. We adopt the 
simplest of assumption of expectations by setting E[At] = At-1.
23 
                                                 
23 Carlaw, Lipsey and Bekar (monograph) provide a lot of detail on the transitions from one GPT to 
another giving four different versions of the model that deal with different nuances. Here we adopt 
thier transition model one for convenience. In this case the new GPT comes into use immediately upon 3.2 Model of Structural Adjustment 
A new GPT may be well or poorly adapted to the existing facilitating structure.
24 
Typically real resources must be invested in substantial adjustments to many of the 
elements of the structure to accommodate the new GPT.
25  
We begin with the simplifying assumption that all of the structural adjustments takes 
place in the applied R&D sector, which we justify on two grounds. The first is 
simplicity. Having the structural adjustment in one sector is sufficient to demonstrate 
the qualitative outcomes. The second is that many of the actual structural adjustment 
problems do occur in the application of the GPT to various uses (e.g., the application 
of electricity to factories required a new organizational technology as well as several 
innovations in the applications of electricity to machines and tools). 
Much of the previous model is preserved when economic structure is explicitly 
included. Equations 2 and 4-9 are unaltered. The resource constraint is altered to 
reflect the fact that resources must be allocated among four instead of the original 
three lines of activity: 
(10)                                            ,,, tc ta tg ts , t R rrrr = +++ 
Where, rs, is the resource allocated to structural adjustment. This adjustment is 
assumed to have effect only in the applied R&D sector. As with the previous model, 
the arrival of a new GPT increases Gt in equations (11). However, the arrival of the 
new GPT comes with a structural adjustment cost SAt (equation 12) below, which 
reduces the immediate impact of the new GPT. 

















   with  2 (0,1),   (1,2), and  1 i i β β ∈ =< . 
Where  [0,1] χ ∈  allows only a portion of realised pure knowledge to influence applied 
R&D. (We make this assumption to simplify the forthcoming total factor productivity 
calculations.) SAt is defined as follows: 






= SA . 
This is a decreasing function of the total impact of the new GPT, defined as SCt 
(equation 13), and an increasing function of the structural adjustment effort, St, that 
accumulates from the point that the GPT arrives (equation 14). 
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it arrival regardless of it productivity enhancing effects in the applied R&D sector relative to the old 
GPT.  
24  This observation is made by a number of historians and students of technological change such as 
David (1990), Freeman and Perez (1988), Freeman and Louca (2001), Perez (2002), Lipsey and Bekar 
(1995) Lipsey, Bekar and Carlaw (1998b), and Carlaw, Lipsey and Bekar (manuscript). 
25 Although we do not introduce labour explicitly in the model, we note that these structural adjustment 
costs can be sever when the arriving GPT causes big dislocations by separating significant numbers of 
workers from there work when an old technology is made obsolete.   SCt is the cost of structural adjustment defined as a function of the total impact of the 
new GPT, which we model by taking the difference between the total value of the 
new GPT relative to the old and a random variable ψt drawn from a Beta distribution. 
The structural adjustment costs are assumed to follow a logistic diffusion process 
similar to the GPT itself. So that as the GPT has a bigger impact it creates more 
structural adjustment costs. However, in order to match the empirical observations 
that structural adjustment costs are up front and productivity benefits of GPTs are 
occur later made in earlier chapters we assume that γs > γ τs < τ so that the structural 
adjustment impacts occur more quickly than the productivity diffusion of the GPT. 
St is the accumulated effort to adapt structure to a new GPT. 
(14)                                                  1(1 ) ttt t SsS φ − = +− , 
where 
                                                  ( ) , (1 ) tt G χ =− s t r s , and 
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st is the output flow of structural adjustment and (1-χ) is the proportion of pure 
knowledge that influences the productivity of resources in structural adjustment. st is 
dependent on the amount of resources devoted to producing adjustment in structure, 
rs,t, and a portion of the stock of useful pure knowledge, (1 - χ) Gt. This last 
assumption is made to ensure that resources devoted to producing structural 
adjustment increase in productivity at a rate similar to resources in all other lines of 
production in the system. 
The two key sources of structural adjustment costs observed when a new GPT arrives, 
the new investment in structure that the new GPT requires due to its new 
complementarities with its many new applications and the amount of the old structure 
that is rendered useless by the new GPT are modelled as random variables. This is 
done to reflect the uncertainty about their size from GPT to GPT. The first random 
variable, ψt, conditions SC
h
t reflecting the amount of new investment in structure that 
is required due to the novelty of the technology and its complementarities with new 
applications. The second random variable, φt depreciates or makes obsolete the 
previously accumulated investments in structure measured as the stock, St. During the 
life of an incumbent GPT, φt is zero and upon the arrival of the new GPT, φt is a 
random variable between 0 and 1 chosen from a uniform distribution. This implies 
that some of the structure that was adjusted to the existing GPT is not useful in 
facilitating the new GPT. 
(15)                                                 [ ] ( | , ) ,    0 2 tc c sb e t a x s ψ νη = <<  
The constant sc allows the random variable drawn from the beta distribution to take on 
values larger than one. This, combined with the calibration of ν and η, determines the 
probability that ψt is greater than or less than one. ς is drawn from a Uniform 
distribution with support of [0, 1]. 
The maximization problem includes the allocation of resources to structural 
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                                                  and equations 12 – 15 
3.3 Simulation of the model 
The model is solved using numerical simulation which requires calibrating parameter 
values. We choose values in order to achieve long run average growth rates of 
approximately 2% and GPT arrival rates of on average 30-35 periods. The qualitative 
results are robust to a wide rage of parameter values that meet the restriction specified 
in the model.  
Table 3.1: Model parameters 
Baseline three sector model  
The parameter values chosen for this simulation are illustrative of a wide rage of 
possible values that meet our assumptions. We have tested a wide range of these 
values to ensure the robustness of the qualitative results. 
α1 = 1      α1 = 0.34      β1 = 1      β2 = 0.34
     
 σ1 = 1     σ2 = 0.34      v = 1      A0 = 1 
     
G0 = 1     R = rc,t + ra,t + rg,t= 1000  ε = 0.01     δ = 0.01
  
γ = 0.06    τ = -6        µ = 0.5      
For λ we choose ν = 5 and η = 10. The threshold value of λ* = 0.64. For ϑ we choose 
ν = 10, η = 5 and s = 1. As stated in the text θt is a random variable distributed 
uniformly with support [0.8, 1.2], mean 1, and variance (0.4)
2/12. 
 
Structural adjustment, four sector model 
The parameterization for the model of structural adjustment is the same as the 
baseline model with the following additions. 
 
χ =  0.8    R = rc,t + ra,t + rg,t + rs,t = 1000      β3 = 0.85
   
 γs = 0.08    τs = -8     
All other parameter values are defined in the text. 
 
  
The growth properties of this model are discussed at length in Carlaw and Lipsey 
(2001, 2005 forthcoming) and Carlaw et al (monograph Chapter 14). In this paper we 
is 
ledge growth from 
te TFP and technological knowledge growth rates using 










includes all of the inputs and outputs of our baseline three sector model 
)
wish to apply the model to an analysis of the assumptions of TFP measurement. It 
this task that we turn our attention to next. 
4. Calculating TPF and know
simulated data 
In this section we calcula
artificial data simulated f
relationship between TFP growth and technological change and identify what 
assumptions of the model are critical to these relationships. Thus, we begin the 
process of developing a theory of TFP as it relates to technology driven econom
growth. In particular we focus on the effect that structural adjustment has on the
relationship between TFP growth and technological change as this is often an 
identifiable feature of what Carlaw et al (monograph) call transforming GPTs. (i.
GPTs that require large transformations of the existing production system and 
myriad previously impossible lines of production activity.) 
4.1 TFP and technological change in the baseline m
In this section, we calculate TFP growth using our simulated data an
conditions, if any, changes in TFP measures technological change.
26
calculations illustrate our more general argument (given in the Appendix to Chapter 4 
of Carlaw et al (monograph), Carlaw and Lipsey (2003) and Lipsey and Car
forthcoming) that changes in TFP measure only a small subset of the spillovers 
associated with technological change and not technological change itself.
27  
To calculate total factor productivity growth we start with an accounting iden




                                                
where pi’s,  {, , } ic a g ∈  are output prices and qj’s, with the subscripts 
{ , , } jr c r a r A g ∈ , are input prices. The first letter of the inpu
scripts indicates the input and the second letter the sector in which the input is use
rc e price of the resource input used in the consumer goods
sector, while qGa means the price of pure knowledge in the applied R&D sector. We 
,,, g A c G a
ple, q  means For exam  th
 
26 In what fallows we use technological knowledge, pure and applied knowledge and technology 
interchangeably. In our model it is the technological knowledge generated in the pure and applied 
knowledge sectors that is technological change which drives growth.  
27 As we noted in the introduction we are not the first to argue that TFP does not measure technological 
change. See, for example, Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) and Hulten (2000). However, we go further 
than these other authors by arguing that TFP is only an imperfect measure of a small subset of the 
spillovers associated with technological change and that sustained growth with zero TFP change is 
possible.  can choose any price as a numeraire and for convenience we choose to measure 
everything in consumption units. This requires dividing through the identity by pc to 
establish relative prices. 
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a stationary equilibrium over time), the price of resources must be the same in all 
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Similarly we can derive input prices relative to the price of the consumption good as 
follows: 
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Resources can be used in all three a  equation (19) shows 







ree sectors and Xj’s represent their inputs, 
product of resources in the consumption sector. The input prices of the knowledge 
stocks are not the same in all production functions because A and G are not 
substitutes. So, while A used in the consumption sector can be substituted for A use
in the pure knowledge sector G used in the applied knowledge sector is not a
substitute for A anywhere else. The second line of equation (19) shows the price of the
applied knowledge stock being equal in both the consumption and pure knowl
sector but a specific adjustment for the price of the stock of pure knowledge must be 
made in the last line of equation (19) to make it consistent with all other prices. 
Since the data generated by our model are discrete, we use a Törnqvist index to 
calculate TFP. Our model allows us to measure the rate of growth of technology
directly as the rate of change of the knowledge stocks At and 
a
t G . These stocks a
also aggregated using a Törnqvist index. 
Letting Yi’s represent the outputs of the th
the Törnqvist index of TFP changes is: (20)    
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Measuring TFP and knowledge growth for the individual sectors is straight forward in 
our framework since we know the exact specifications of the production functions. 
So, for example, TFP change in the consumption sector is measured as: 
(21)    [ ] 11 1 2 , , 1 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) tt t t t c tc t TFPc c c A A r r αα   ∆=− − − − −    −− −
Figure
knowle
 5.1 plots the growth rate of aggregate TFP and the growth of aggregate 




interpreted to represent annual data. Clearly, the rate of TFP change is everywh
below the rate of knowledge growth. The correlation coefficient between TFP cha
and aggregate knowledge growth is 0.846 over the five hundred time periods shown
However, the average growth rate of technological knowledge is 1.6% while the 
average growth rate of TFP is 0.6%. So clearly TFP is measuring only a small amount 
of the technological change that is occurring in the system.
28 
 
















Next, we disaggregate to calculate the growth rates at the sector level. Figures 5.2a-c 
show that in the consumption and pure knowledge sectors, TFP is everywhere below 
 
 
                                                
knowledge growth but positively correlated. The applied R&D sector has a TFP 
growth rate that is near zero and everywhere lower than the growth rate of the pure 
knowledge stock. TFP change becomes sharply negative with the arrivals of new 
GPTs in the applied R&D sector. But this is due to the transitions assumption we use
between GPTs. When the new GPT arrives it is utilized regardless of whether its 
contribution to increases in the marginal productivity of resources in the applied R&D
sector is larger or smaller than the incumbents. This produces the temporary spike 
 
28 In simulations with uncertainty turned off TFP is slightly positive but everywhere significantly 
below technological knowledge growth. The Positive TFP growth rate is due to the increasing returns 
to scale in each production function. If the model exhibited constant returns to scale TFP change 
measured with the Tornquist index would be zero.   downward. Because of are assumption that each GPT arrives in a crude from and 
diffuses logistically the probability that the new GPTs contribution is lower than in
the incumbents is high. Alternative transition assumptions remove this spike.  
Figure 5.2a: consumption sector TFP and 
 












Figure 5.2b: Applied R&D sector TFP and 















Figure 5.3c: Pure knowledge sector TFP and 













Alternative simulation runs provide different realization of the random variables and 
thus different quantitative results. However, Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the general 
 in each sector rather than the share weights of the Törnqvist 
                                                
qualitative results.
29 
If the actual exponential parameters of the individual production functions are used to 
calculate TFP growth
index, each sectors TFP growth is zero while the growth technological knowledge is 
positive. Using the Törnqvist index to aggregate yields a positive aggregate TFP 
 
29 Carlaw (2004) provides a sensitivity analysis of the results and demonstrates that TFP does not 
measure technological change by reducing the amount of variability in the system, making the 
probability of an arrival of a GPT in each period equal to one. In all cases TFP growth is everywhere 
significantly below the growth rate of technological knowledge. The reason that TFP is positive at all 
in the system is because the parameterizations used in the simulations are such that all lines of 
production have increasing returns to scale and the Törnqvist index number aggregation method use 
imposes share weights that imply constant returns to scale. growth rate. This is not meant to be an argument that the Törnqvist is an inappropriate
aggregation method in fact it might be argued that allowing the procedure to detec
increasing returns to scale is appropriate. What is does indicate is that if TFP growth 
rate numbers are interpreted to measure changes in technological change, the 
interpretation is wrong. In all cases we have technological change. But what the 
Törnqvist index is detecting is the increasing returns to scale of the system not
technological change per se.   




 change in the structural adjustment model 
We now include all of the inputs and outputs of our four sector structural adjustment 
model in the accounting identity. 
(22) 
pc pa pb ps +++
() () ( ) ( ) (1 ) (1 )
ags
rc c ra a rg g rs s Ac Ga Gs Ag As qr qr qr qr q A q G q G q A qS A µχ χ µ ≡++++ + + − + − +
 where once again pi’s, { , , , } ic a g s ∈  are output prices and qj’s, with the subscripts 
{, , ,, , , , , }
   
c
j rc ra rg rs Ac Ga Gs Ag As ∈ , are input prices. Note that we include SA as an  t
input rather than just S b the ratio of St to SCt that matters in the producti




t ecause it is  on 
function for applied R&D. Again we
() ()     (1 ) (1 )
g as
ccc
rg Ag rc ra rs Ac Ga Gs S
cag




qq qq qq q q q
rrrr s A G G A
ppppp p p p P
µχ χ µ
++







put prices are established as in the previous case: 
(23)                                                    
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Similarly we can derive input prices relative to the price of the consumption good as 
follows: (24)                                           
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Resources can be used in all four activities. So, the first line of equation (24) shows 
all of the resource input prices equal to each other and determined by the marginal 
product of resources in the consumption sector. The input prices of the knowledge 
stocks are not the same in all production functions because A, G and S are not 
substitutes. So, while A used in the consumption sector can be substituted for A used 
in the pure knowledge sector G and S used in the applied knowledge sector are not a 
substitutes for A anywhere else. 
Again, we use a Törnqvist index to calculate TFP and to aggregate the knowledge 
stocks. The sector specific TFP growth rates are again calculated directly from the 
production functions. 
In the present model, there are four outputs, four resource inputs, four knowledge 
inputs and a stock of structural adjustment input. Technological knowledge comprises 
the four stocks of knowledge which are just the accumulated flows of output from the 
pure and applied research sectors divided among the four production activities. These 
are aggregated using a Tornquist index. We assume that the stock of accumulated 
structural adjustment is not included in aggregate knowledge for this illustration, 
though it is arguable that it should be included. When we do include investment in 
structural adjustment as knowledge it strengthens the result that TFP change is either 
unrelated or negatively related to technological knowledge growth.  
Figure 5.9 plots the growth rates of aggregate TFP and knowledge. TFP is now 
negatively correlated with knowledge growth. The correlation coefficient between the 
two rates of change is -0.82. When a GPT arrives, the TFP growth rate drops and in 
many cases becomes negative for several periods. Furthermore, as some GPTs mature 
TFP growth increase and over estimates actual technological change. The implication 
is that when new GPTs require adjustments in the facilitating structure, changes in 
measured TFP will slow down even though actual technological change is 
accelerating over several periods. In the case shown, a maximum of 4.6 percent (an 
average of 1.8 percent) of the economy’s total resources are allocated to structural 
adjustment. Yet, this small resource cost has significant implications for TFP growth 
rates and their interpretation as measures of technological change. A small diversion 
of resources out of other productive activities into the activity of structural adjustment 
can cause significant drops in the TFP growth rate (in some cases the rate becomes 
negative).  
Furthermore, our results are consistent with the kind of “New Economy” productivity 
bonus experienced in the USA from the mid 1990 into the new Millennium. However, 
our theory predicts that the productivity bonus coincides with a technological 
















Next, we disaggregate to calculate TFP sector by sector. Figures 5.10a-d show the 
TFP change and the growth rate of the knowledge stock that goes into production in 
each sector. In all but the applied R&D case TFP change is positive and positively 
correlated with, but everywhere below the growth rate of knowledge in that sector. 
TFP change is negatively correlated with knowledge growth in the applied R&D 
sector and negative when GPTs arrive.  














Figure 5.10b: Applied R&D sector TFP and 










 Figure 5.10c: Pure knowledge sector TFP and 














Figure 5.10d: Pure knowledge sector TFP and 












Once again it can be shown that if the exponential parameter values in each line of 
production in the system are used to calculate TFP, then the TFP growth rates are very 
close to zero in each sector and become slightly negatively correlated with TFP in 
some sectors.  
The analysis demonstrates that TFP growth does not reflect technological change, at 
least within the framework. What TFP growth does reflect is the increasing returns to 
scale in the production functions of the system. Also what is clear is that in the 
aggregate sufficiently high structural adjustment costs cause TFP growth to become 
strongly negatively correlated with technological change which manifests in the 
model as knowledge growth.  
It should also be noted that our aggregate is artificial in the sense that we have one 
consumption sector, two knowledge producing sectors and in the second model an 
additional structural adjustment sector. In reality it is often the case that all of these 
production activities take place with in a given measured sector in the national 
accounts. For example, the steam engine was invented by the mining sector and 
spread in its application to many other sectors of the first industrial revolution 
economies. What we have called the applied R&D and structural adjustment sectors 
certainly exist as components of the industrial sectors measured in the national 
accounts of most economies.
30 For example, in the sectors of the New Zealand 
economy that we examine in the next section, applications of ICT are being 
undertaken by firms within the sectors for which data is reported. Firms within these 
sectors are adopting ICT technologies and adapting it to their needs, through a process 
of costly investment and internal innovation. In this sense the results that our 
simulated aggregate TFP calculation is generating are most appropriately interpreted 
to reflect the kind of TFP calculation we should expect to see in each of the industries 
in the New Zealand data examined in the next section. 
                                                 
30 It is debatable whether pure knowledge is more appropriately treated as a separate sector in today’s 
world of science based bio-technology and nano-technology driven primary research. One further note of qualification is required. The model and simulation exercise is one 
where there is only ever one GPT operating in the system at any moment in time. In 
contrast, real economies comprise several GPTs, all at different stages in their own 
logistic diffusions, and which all affect the system in myriad interrelated ways. For 
examples, Australia is currently experiencing the rapid diffusion of ICT along side 
applications of lasers and made to order materials. It is continuing to experience the 
impact of electricity through an ever increasing development of applications for this 
power GPT. There are many other examples that could be noted but this suffices to 
make the point. All of these technologies have influences on the measures of 
performance even at the disaggregated industry level discussed in the next section. 
Furthermore, these different technologies have different impacts in these different 
industries or sectors.  
Carlaw, et al (monograph chapter 14) provide the algebra to suggest that a model of 
multiple GPTs is possible within their framework, but to date it has not been 
implemented in a computer simulation. However, the framework developed here 
provides for the possibility of a quick-and-dirty multiple GPT simulation. If we 
aggregate data from the baseline model and the structural adjustment model to 
calculate TFP growth and knowledge growth we find that a number of possibilities 
emerge.
31 Depending on the realizations of the random variables in each model the 
correlation between TFP growth and knowledge growth becomes less negative and 
less significant. In some cases the correlation is not significantly different from zero. 
This simulated result comes closer to some of the empirical results we observe in the 
next section. But, until the complete formal model has been constructed and a proper 
calibration made for each measured sector or industry under analysis, nothing more 
than casual inference can be made. Thus, a note of caution is warranted when 
interpreting the statistical results derived from the forthcoming section. These cannot 
be viewed as supporting evidence for the theory and simulation of the GPT model is 
warranted. The empirical analysis is consistent with the theory but does not constitute 
a rigorous test of it.  
The empirical analysis is an indication that TFP growth is not measuring 
technological change and the model and simulation analysis suggest an avenue of 
investigation as to why that might be the case. Furthermore, the model if judged to be 
appropriate begins to offer a theoretical interpretation of TFP that is at least consistent 
with observed productivity slowdowns and a sometimes negative contemporaneous 
correlation between TFP growth and technological change. 
4. New Zealand ICT Diffusion and Productivity 
The contributions of embodied technological change to TFP growth have been studied 
in the growth accounting literature. Hulten (1992) and Jorgenson (1966) have focused 
on the measurement of the efficiency of the capital stock and the effects of 
measurement errors on productivity estimates. These authors argue that quality 
change (or Investment Specific Technological (IST) change growth) is difficult to 
observe, and therefore may not be measured accurately in the National Income and 
Product Accounts (NIPA). In order to obtain an estimate of the size of error associate 
with the official capital stock estimates, Hulten used quality-corrected data from 
                                                 
31 The aggregation was done by taking crude averages of the growth rate of TFP and knowledge. A 
more sophisticated analysis requires the fully integrated computer simulation code suggested in the 
Carlaw, Lipsey and Bekar (monograph) multiple model. Gordon (1990). Gordon found that the official deflators for producer durable 
equipment overstate quality-corrected inflation in capital goods, and therefore 
understate increases in capital input.  
Following Greenwood et al (1997 and 2000), Carlaw and Kosempel (2004) adopt a 
computable general equilibrium approach to measuring changes in the quality of 
investment in Canada. They demonstrate that IST made important contributions to 
Canadian output growth during the 1961-96 period. One of the key results that they 
establish is that IST is negatively correlated with TFP particularly since 1974.  
IST is calculated by making the unrealistic assumption that the economy, sector or 
industry under examination in is a perfectly competitive general equilibrium which 
has become characterized as the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model following the 
pioneering work of Ramsey (1928) Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965). In this 
framework the microeconomic decisions of consumers determine the saving rates, 
levels of consumption and stocks of capital in the economy whose aggregate 
production capacity is characterised by a constant returns to scale production function 
defined over capital and labour.
32  
Within such a framework constant income share weights but an increasing capital to 
labour ratio can only be reconciled by an increasing quality of capital, which is the 
result that Carlaw and Kosempel (2004) verify empirically. In their analysis the 
measure of residual neutral technological change, which would be equal to TFP in the 
absence of increases in investment quality, is negative over much of the period from 
1974 onward. They interpret this negative measure to potentially indicate a structural 
adjustment cost associated with the adoption of the new technology implicit in the 
high quality capital investments of the sort discussed by David (1990) and Lipsey, 
Bekar and Carlaw (1998b). We return to this issue latter in the paper when we discuss 
the industry level Australian data.  
We report here some of our follow up analysis of changes in investment quality and 
changes in TFP in 16 OECD countries (where comparable data was available) reveals 
that the negative relationship between IST and TFP change appeared in most of the 
countries in the data set. The data span the period 1970 to 1997, although the times 
serries are not as long for some countries included in the analysis. Correlations and 
their significance are calculated by linearly regressing TFP growth on IST growth. 
This simple procedure allows for easy calculation of correlation and the statistical 
significance of the correlation between the two rates of change, however, it also has 
some obviously flawed assumptions in that it is unlikely that the relationship between 
TFP and IST growth is linear. We use it because reveals that there is clearly 
something wrong with TFP as a contemporaneous measure of technological change.  
Table 4.1 
  Correlation  Significance Ave. TFP growth Ave. IST growth 
Australia  -0.2003968 -1.625798274 0.005659614  0.030617859 
                                                 
32 It is important to note that the assumption of constant returns to scale is a very strong one and one on 
which the entire calculation depends. In the absence of constant returns to scale it is not clear that IST 
is solely a measure of investment quality. We maintain the assumption here and use the measure as 
being indicative of the point that TFP does not measure changes in technology even though our 
independent measure of technological change, IST, is itself likely imperfect. Austria  0.08229683 0.797660716 0.006229159  0.014620765 
Canada  -0.0352858 -0.45167094 0.004854536  0.066904922 
Germany  -0.9011252 -1.908711555 0.002441211  0.01003906 
Denmark  0.05655763 0.486804643 0.006646929  0.013692764 
Spain  -0.1684784 -1.193274005 0.007006918  0.017480885 
Finland  -0.355621 -1.485503129 0.009873589  0.00124906 
France  0.0950263 0.664095684 0.008940826  0.022266437 
United Kingdom -0.3561123  -3.451808317 0.008177637 0.011128314 
Greece  -0.1231186 -2.570949582 0.000862841 0.025734561 
Ireland  -0.0474524 -0.350604117 0.015489796  0.017249422 
Italy  -0.029527 -0.184041154 0.005292738  0.010806238 
Japan  0.42931646  2.932067842 0.009564838 0.039670992 
Netherlands  0.29245471  2.300423326 -1.94774E-05 0.01748624 
New Zealand  -0.2171726 -1.299822494 -0.00088776  0.049056889 
Sweden  0.06241575 0.559180659 0.003969073  0.020516658 
The results shown in Table 4.1 indicate that the relationship between TFP and IST is 
week. In most cases there is a negative relationship, in two cases a significant one. 
Only in two cases is there a significant positive relationship. Given the assumptions 
necessary to make these calculations we do not draw any strong conclusions. But we 
take this as weak evidence that there is no relationship between our independent 
measure of technological change and TFP growth. There is possibly a negative 
relationship over the period examined at least for some economies.  
In addition to the empirical evidence on investment quality we are able to track ICT 
diffusion in New Zealand proximately, over a relatively short time horizon by looking 
at the diffusion of mobile telephones, internet domains, web sites and internet uses in 
the economy.  
 




























 Figure 4.1 shows the levels of use of mobile phones, Internet domains, web sites and 
Internet users in New Zealand during the period 1988-2002.
33 The data have a logistic 
looking diffusion pattern. Unfortunately not all of the series cover the whole period. 
For example, the number of web sites only runs from 1998 to 2002. In spite of the 
limited data we are able to do some analysis that goes some way toward testing the 
hypotheses that emerge from the traditional and non-traditional views.  
The traditional view argues that technological change is contemporaneously 
correlated with productivity change. The non-traditional view argues that 
technological change will be either uncorrelated or negatively contemporaneously 
correlated with productivity change. It also argues that productivity change will 
understate technological change. 















































































































Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show the rates of TFP change and diffusion rates for the nine 
industrial sectors of New Zealand and the four measures of diffusion. The diffusion 
                                                 
33 The data on ICT diffusion comes from the New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development’s report 
titled Statistics on Information Technology in New Zealand: Updated to 2003: URL 
http://www.med.govt.nz/pbt/infotech/it-stats/it-stats-2003/. rates are all above the TFP growth rates. This is consistent with the non-traditional 
views argument that TFP is not a measure of the rate of technological change. 
To test the hypothesis that TFP change is contemporaneously correlated with 
technological change we linearly regress TFP growth on the diffusion rate of mobile 
telephones in New Zealand. We choose only mobile telephones because it is the 
longest time series we have, allowing for the best statistical result. Table 4.1 reports 
correlation coefficients and t statistics as well average growth rates of TFP for each 
industry. 
Table 4.2 
SECTOR Correlation  Significance Ave. TFP growth Ave. diffusion rate 
Primary  0.00 -0.08  0.01  0.51 
Mining and Quarrying  -0.09 -1.19  0.00  0.51 
Construction  0.00 0.08  -0.02  0.51 
Manufacturing  0.02 0.74  0.00  0.51 
Electricity, gas and water  0.05 1.44  0.00  0.51 
Transport and communications  0.03 1.36  0.06  0.51 
Business and property services  -0.03 -1.49  0.00  0.51 
Personal and community services  0.00 0.13  0.01  0.51 
Retail and wholesale trade  0.01 0.65  0.01  0.51 
 
The critical value of the one tailed test with a 95% level of confidence and 13 degrees 
of freedom is 2.16. In all cases we have a failure to reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient is significantly different from zero.  
5. Conclusions 
We set out in paper to analyse two views of technology diffusion in the context of 
ICT diffusion in New Zealand. In doing so, we begin the development of a theory of 
MFP or TFP by developing a multi-sector model of endogenous GPT-driven growth. 
The need for such a theory arrises out of the mutually incompatible interpretations of 
the measures technological and productivity change. Such a need also arrises out of 
the inconsistency in the interpretation of TFP growth as a measure of technological 
change when compared to other independent measures of technological change such 
as IST. The two different measures appear to be uncorrelated or even negatively 
correlated.  
To begin the process of developing a theory of TFP we build two models of GPT-
driven growth – a basic three sector model and a four sector model that includes 
structural adjustment costs – based on the historical and theoretical research of Carlaw 
and Lipsey (monograph), as well as, a cruder earlier versions of the three sector model 
(Carlaw and Lipsey (2001 and 2005)). In the models, a sequence of GPTs arrive each 
at uncertain times and with uncertain productive impacts that diffuse according to a 
logistic process. The models assume behaviour that results in resource allocations 
such that a non-stationary equilibrium is generated. The model has the property that in 
the absence of future GPTs there are diminishing returns and growth asymptotically 
approaches zero. But the arrival of new GPTs rejuvenates the growth process.  
Because this model requires a numerical solution procedure that is iterated through 
several periods it provides a ready opportunity for Monte Carlo analysis of the 
assumptions that underlay both endogenous growth modelling and TFP growth 
calculations. We do such and exercise here and confirm the arguments of Carlaw and Lipsey (2003) and Lipsey and Carlaw (2004) and Carlaw (2004) that TFP is not a 
measure of technological change. We find that while under some conditions TFP is 
positively correlated with direct and independent measures of technological change it 
persistently under estimates such technological change. Under other conditions, such 
as structural adjustment to accommodate a new GPT, TPF growth is negatively 
correlated with measured technological change and persistently underestimates 
technological change when a new GPT arrives and overestimates technological 
change as the GPT matures. In both model TFP fails detect the arrival of GPTs 
appropriately (i.e., as big technological shocks). 
The findings in the IST empirical analysis and the simple empirical analysis of the 
New Zealand ICT diffusion data are consistent with the view that ICT is a major new 
transforming GPT that generates the kind of structural adjustment costs discussed in 
Lipsey, Bekar and Carlaw (1998b) and Carlaw et al (Monograph). However, all of 
these empirical findings have to be viewed with a critical eye because there are a 
number of assumptions necessary to interpret the measures of technological change as 
being valid. Although, they do have the property that they are independent measures 
of technological change and therefore provide some basis of comparison and testing 
of the various interpretations of TFP growth, they are limited in terms of the number 
of observations. Thus, very limited inference can be drawn. They point in a common 
direction. TFP does not measure technological change. Furthermore, it may be 
negatively correlated with technological change when that change is driven by a 
transforming GPT such as ICT, which is something that the theory predicts. What the 
results suggest is that further research is warranted. In particular more attention must 
be paid to collecting independent measures of technological change and more 
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